ISRAEL AND HAMAS, GLOBAL ESCALATION OR ANOTHER TERRITORIAL REDEFINITION? LIGHTS AND SHADOWS OF ISRAELI DEFENSE BETWEEN THE THIRST FOR VENGEANCE AND STRATEGIC CALCULATIONS
PRODROMIC CRITICISMS
A major attack, therefore, was not a matter of if, but when, and knowing Hamas's modus operandi, it would be during Shabbat, the hours when Israel is most vulnerable. For years, the Israeli armed forces have become less secular and more tied to religious orthodoxy. Today, it is quite common to see soldiers with tefillin, engaged in prayer. The architect of this progressive mix of religion and defense for some is Moshe Ya'alon, a general and former Minister of Defense (2013-2016), but as often happens, the reason is attributable to many factors.
The US and several Western states generously pay Israelis with expertise in computer, engineering, and operational skills. Whether it's useful to have a Plan B in another state or for higher salaries, many secular, Ashkenazi, Sephardic, and Italkim Jews have emigrated elsewhere, even if only for a short period, dangerously leaving the cyber sector uncovered. The Ministry of Defense has replaced them with Israelis of Palestinian origin and of Islamic faith. To counterbalance their presence (and monitor them), numerous Orthodox Ashkenazi women have been chosen, who, after accelerated courses in computer science, have started working side by side with Arab citizens. The presence of Orthodox personnel has been useful, of course, but, as with all ultra-Orthodox civilians and military personnel, their considerable religious faith has - at least in part - limited their operational capacity. It's one thing to consume only kosher food, another thing never to work on Saturdays, or to hope that the eruv wires are numerous enough to bypass the halakhic prohibition (1).
Acts of heroism and dedication by military rabbis who encountered Palestinians preparing to attack a military outpost during Shabbat have not been lacking (2), but what if these extremists had lurked far beyond the eruv? Would ultra-Orthodox soldiers have noticed them? And if someone had cut the eruv wires, as has happened several times? Often, these wires are cut by secular Jews who resent the spread of religious impositions, but a Palestinian who wanted to launch an attack on a military outpost during Shabbat could do so without great difficulty, and the tactical advantage would not be negligible. A third of the troops would be completely useless. However, the situation with the neighbors, as has been the case for at least 3000 years, was not the most optimistic, and many soldiers were needed to defend the territory. Enlisting Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox soldiers (Haredim with Chassidic subgroups and even former Satmar) was the most logical choice, especially since military service is mandatory for men from the Druze, Circassian, and Samaritan minorities. The latter, then, are systematically enlisted, even though sometimes they lean towards the Palestinians, just think of Nader Sadakah, a Samaritan leader of the PFLP. It follows that enlisting "pure" Jewish soldiers, ultra-Orthodox or Orthodox, would have posed organizational difficulties and, obviously, even greater frictions with women and the Palestinian minority, but it would not have jeopardized classified information and state security.
Other critical factors that allowed an attack of this magnitude are attributable, as many analysts have pointed out, to the simple but ingenious planning of Hamas, with the choice not to use computers, cell phones, and bank accounts, in favor of paper messages, old phones, and cryptocurrencies (a stratagem popular among mafia clans), with the use of hang gliders and dozens of vehicles disguised as Israeli police cars (3). But as early as 2014, there were reports of Hamas militants trained in paragliding in Malaysia (4). The strategy adopted by the terrorists is by no means new, and it was difficult to prevent its implementation from the beginning because it relied on primitive, non-monitored techniques, not governed by AI and technological systems. What Israel lacked was an effective system of infiltration from a preventive perspective (more Mizrahi in Gaza) and, above all, adequate protection for civilians. Today, fitness trackers and smart rings with GPS are increasingly being used; there are even models indistinguishable from wedding rings. In the event of abduction, equipping a significant percentage of civilians living in the kibbutzim of the Golan Desert with these objects could be a useful investment. Another problematic factor is related to volunteers' access to kibbutz plans and the publication on social media of information important to the settlers' lives. Since in the Western world, there are even Jews justifying Hamas men, considering them simple guerrillas fighting for freedom, it would be advisable to evaluate with greater prudence and discernment the entry of volunteers into the kibbutz and the consequent sharing of confidential information.
MOLEDET AND NAKAM, HOMELAND AND VENGEANCE
The Bible is replete with decidedly unkind phrases like: "They will be pierced with the sword, and their flesh will be pieces for the foxes" (5), and originally, Yahweh was more akin to Baal than to the peaceful deity Europeans are accustomed to thinking about. Despite being a logical people, where study and research play a predominant role, Jews and Israelis have a strong sense of honor and national pride that implies, inevitably, vengeance, especially when the disgrace is significant and there are no rational means to overcome it.
Part of this "suspension of rationality" in favor of blind violence is due to the concept of "Cherem," God's anathema that mandated the killing of enemies. Even secular, atheist, or agnostic Jews are not at all resigned. After World War II, the Nakam group (נקם, revenge), led by secular socialist Abba Kovner, aimed to avenge the Holocaust by poisoning Bavaria's water supply; the project failed, but it speaks volumes about the risks those who want to play "risk" with the Jews face, challenging the Moledet, the beloved Motherland awaited for almost two millennia. Abducting women and children is seen as an abominable act undermining the genetic future of an extremely small population, where the government even sponsors in vitro fertilization for single women, and where even the sperm of soldiers who died in battle becomes precious (6). Israel's massive response, therefore, surprised only Hamas, not Jews or Israelis. Moreover, Hamas leaders were rather naive to attack now, with Netanyahu in power. Probably, if they had done so during the Bennett-Lapid government, when there was even an Arab party in the majority, the outcome of the Israeli counteroffensive would have been less bloody.
EYE FOR AN EYE, TOOTH FOR A TOOTH. RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE AND WAR
As of today, November 11, 2023, the casualties of the war between Hamas and Israel are 11,078 in the Gaza Strip, 190 in the West Bank, 93 in Lebanon, 19 in Syria, and 1,270 among Jews. Attacking to defend the existence of one's Motherland is more than justified, but, according to IHL, attacks on military targets must not cause civilian casualties considered "excessive" compared to the "direct military advantage anticipated" (7).
Now, having established that killing a certain number of civilians, as deplorable as it may be, is not a war crime, it needs to be verified whether Israel has violated the principle of proportionality. From a numerical perspective, there has been a tenfold increase in casualties. For some, it's a sadistic response bordering on Schadenfreude; for others, it's simply excessive. The fact remains that international humanitarian law is intentionally ambiguous in this regard. In a hypothetical future, if humanity were to reach a certain level of intellectual maturity centered on impartiality and ethics, legislation would detail the allowed number of civilians killed and what strictly constitutes an "anticipated direct military advantage." Since determining an exact number of civilian casualties might seem like trivializing the law or an unwarranted appropriation of statistical methodologies, it may safeguard against excessive interpretative distortions.
Regarding the anticipated direct military advantage, connected in turn to the principle of military necessity aimed at weakening the enemy's military capability, one could argue that "anticipating" the end of Hamas or at least the impossibility of its dominance over Palestinian territory justifies Israeli actions. Obviously, even taking control of territory and governing it would constitute an adequate "anticipated direct military advantage." Even in the rather remote scenario where Israel fails to set the entire Gaza Strip ablaze and govern it, it would not violate the principle of proportionality, as long as the advantage in question is "anticipated," not realized. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, who investigated war crime allegations during the 2003 invasion of Iraq, did not find irregularities despite Coalition casualties numbering 172 against a significant number of Iraqis ranging, according to estimates, from 11,000 to 45,000 (8). For the reasons mentioned above, today's international humanitarian law is largely tied to strategic hegemony and geopolitical roles, rather than ethics and the common good, especially considering that ethics varies from culture to culture. As of now, balancing humanitarian principles with wartime needs remains utopian, particularly when judging a powerful state. It should also be noted that the ongoing rocket attacks on Israel by Hamas and Hezbollah, after more than a month of war, do not help the Palestinian cause. Defenseless Israeli citizens continue to be injured by rockets, especially in the south. In a hypothetical trial, Israeli jurists, known for their academic expertise, would likely exploit this element.
WHAT ISRAEL COULD GAIN AND LOSE
Since the time of Moshe Dayan onward, any Israeli declaring, "Masada shall not fall again" (Sheynit Masada lo tipul - שנית מסדה לא תיפול) knows well what this oath implies. If Israel were to fall again, there would be no other chances for a rebirth. After the Babylonian captivity, a fracture with the Samaritans emerged, and after the Roman invasion and subsequent diaspora, the Jewish people became even more diversified. Another diaspora would signify the absolute end of any cohesion, the definitive conclusion of Jewish culture in Israel and worldwide. There would be no room for territorialism similar to the Uganda Scheme, the Fugu Plan, or the Madagascar Plan. The Jewish people would simply be absorbed by other populations, and with great difficulty, given the lingering anti-Semitism in the West. Within two or three centuries, Hebrew would only be studied in Archaeology courses.
It is, therefore, explained why Israel emerged from this attack more united than ever. There are scattered dissenting groups among Israelis, including relatives of the kidnapped, as well as among European and American Jews. Yet, Netanyahu has garnered enormous consensus, strengthening a leadership that has been precarious for years. How long this harmony with the Jewish/Israeli people and its government allies will last is hard to say, as much will depend on the course of the war. But it is clear that the counteroffensive cannot last much longer and de-escalation is at least desiderable. On Israhelp, there are ads to help supply soldiers with storm suits, tarps, tents, and winter thermal equipment. This information can be interpreted in multiple ways. In a mundane sense, it could mean a shortage of winter equipment jeopardizing a long-term action, but this is unlikely given Israel's wealth and secrecy. The Middle Eastern state is aware of being spied on, as indicated on the site in various posts. Therefore, it is more likely a veiled message to enemies, conveying, "We are willing to fight for months, even for years, if necessary." Other posts referring to languages from around the world imply (and convey to Palestinians) a widespread protective network. Indeed, it all seems to play out in this dilemma: who has the most "widespread protection," in a game of real and boasted power in which one must make the enemy perceive that one is not diplomatically isolated or financially doomed, to give the illusion that one can fight for a long time and even win.
The Palestinian anti-Israel galaxy (Hamas, PFLP, DFLP, RPC, PFLP-GC) and the non-Palestinian one (Hezbollah, Amal Movement, and the Houthis) are far from isolated. Major financiers include Qatar, Iran, and even many NGOs, although the latter participate unknowingly. Some financiers will always remain in the shadows through cryptocurrencies and shell companies. This element also fits into a strategy of tension in which Israel fights, like in a queen's gambit, the pawn sacrificing itself in the opening: the paramilitary groups.
It is worth asking whether it is time for Iran to come out in the open and take the initiative. Its nuclear facilities in the Zagros Mountains are deep enough to be untouchable, and no one knows exactly where its nuclear program stands. However, given Israel's particular geographic extent, even if it were to launch a nuclear bomb, it would be impossible not to hit Palestinians in the West Bank, those in the Gaza Strip, or other Arabs in neighboring states. Iran can call all the nuclear warheads it wants "Kheibar," like a Jewish castle conquered by Muslims in the 7th century, but at present, it is difficult for it to have the power and will to strike. The impossibility of using atomic weapons also applies, of course, to Israel, despite what Amihai Eliyahu says, and to understand this, one only needs to look at Alex Wellerstein's Nukemap. Certainly, hitting other targets far from Israel would be possible, but this would not only create a powder keg in the Middle East but a genuine global escalation. Therefore, it is not only possible but more than likely that, for both parties involved, such action can only be taken as a last resort.
As for U.S. support, Israel may be under the dome of the U.S. Navy, but the USS Gerald R. Ford and all other aircraft carriers come at an exorbitant cost, and nothing is given for nothing. Antony Blinken may have Jewish origins like Kissinger, but, contrary to what Golda Meir thought, a secretary is truly "first American, then Secretary of State, and finally Jewish." No American will ever read from right to left, even if Israelis like to think otherwise. Blinken has already complained about "too many deaths," and Zelensky increasingly appears in press conferences to demonstrate his "closeness to the Jewish people, victims of Putin." If the war against Hamas continues for a long time, Israel will not just send a few weapons to Ukraine, discreetly, but will have to do so massively and prominently. The Ukrainians (NATO) will demand the Iron Dome and maybe even the Arrow 3 system. Israeli geopolitical freedom will become a memory, and the rift with the Sino-Russians will be insurmountable. Although the U.S. and NATO have an interest in emphasizing the BRICS group's proximity to Hamas, Chinese and Russian support is a façade, not implying a change in the status quo or the annihilation of Israel. The Chinese have the problem of the Uighurs, and the Russians must deal with the Chechens and other Islamic minorities. Even the Indians would never want the dissolution of Israel and Arab dominance in the region, due to Punjab and rivalry with Pakistan. For the Asian giants, the Islamic world is a useful puppet to use against the United States, but once they reach a certain threshold, it is difficult for them to go further, as they would risk dangerous territorial disintegration. China and Russia, moreover, for historical-cultural reasons, have a communist legacy that does not sit well with the extremism and misogyny of Islamic extremists.
TERRITORIAL REDEFINITION AND THE TWO-STATE PROBLEM
Will conquering the Gaza Strip really achieve anything? Certainly, destroying Hamas's offensive capability will bring some peace to the kibbutzim and cities in the Negev, at least for a few years, but the Palestinian mentality cannot be changed overnight. In the Palestinian territories, there is a dangerous mix of antisemitism and crude ignorance, and it is futile to deny it by clinging to statistics of an increasingly educated population thanks to dubious degrees handed out by NGOs and complacent organizations (10). Anyone reading the archaeological section of Israeli newspapers will eventually come across comments from many Palestinians who hypothesize that Israeli artifacts are fake because "Jews did not historically inhabit those lands."
Such widespread ignorance, evasion of responsibility, and obstinacy are not only disheartening but also place practical limits on any diplomatic effort. The truth is that Palestinians rejected a two-state solution in 1936, in 1946, during the 2000 meetings between Barak, Clinton, and Arafat, and in 2007-2008 when Olmert proposed it to Abbas. Most likely, even if Israel were to propose it now, exploiting Robert Aumann's "blackmailer paradox" to make them perceive that there won't be other options in the future, an agreement won't be reached. Some blame lies with the British and Americans who, after World War II, gave Israel a truncated state with unique borders, the only leopard-spotted state in the world. The problem with this geographical conundrum is not so much recognizing the independence of the Gaza Strip, which borders Egypt and many Jews would gladly do without, but relinquishing the West Bank, which hosts cities emblematic of the identity of Judea and Samaria, such as Bethlehem, the city of the great King David. As the years go by, the prospects for an agreement will diminish even from the Israeli side. Until a few years ago, Israel was permeated by socialism and secularism, but now the Orthodox component is becoming significant both demographically and politically. In 20 or 30 years, reaching a compromise solution may be impossible. Much will depend not only on the future leaders of the two peoples but also on how the multifaceted nature of the conflict evolves within the context of the "New Great Game."
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