IRAN: ANATOMY OF A VULNERABILITY BETWEEN OROGRAPHY AND WARFARE TACTICS

The recent Israeli strike deep within Iranian territory was not only a significant strategic success but also a memorable blow to a defense system previously assumed to be less vulnerable. For several hours, Iranian command chains were in total disarray, and radar systems failed to provide support. To grasp how this became possible, it is essential to examine the relationship between two elements: the country’s physical geography and its radar coverage.

Iran is a vast country, characterized by a complex orographic structure filled with deserts, plateaus, and mountain ranges. While this morphology is useful for camouflaging and protecting military installations (and for keeping civilians at a safe distance), it is a nightmare for radar systems, as it creates "orographic shadows"—areas of terrain that are obscured from radar line-of-sight. A ground-based radar, even when placed on elevated terrain, has a limited horizon—typically between 30 and 50 kilometers at low altitude—due to Earth’s curvature and the surrounding relief. This results in a patchwork of coverage, filled with “blind corridors,” especially in regions such as Yazd, Kerman, and Semnan, which a well-informed adversary can cross relatively safely by flying at extremely low altitude. Israel, a country with no shortage of geologists and GIS experts, undoubtedly planned its ingress routes based on radar shadows—and has had many years to do so with precision.

Furthermore, since at least 2009, Iran has lacked the essential AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) platforms—early warning systems that can overcome terrain limitations by tracking aerial targets hundreds of kilometers away from an elevated position. During the 1991 Gulf War, some Il-76 aircraft equipped with the Adnan radar system (an Iraqi version of the Soviet A-50 fitted with the French TRS 2105 radar) were stationed in Iran, but these planes suffered from structural issues that were difficult to resolve and were mostly used for propaganda parades (1). Iran also attempted to retrofit Boeing 707s as radar/refueling platforms, but Israeli intelligence was aware that they were not operational. Additional projects like the “T 200 AEW&C” were likely concept models leaked on Reddit, probably intended as intimidation or strategic deterrence (2).

Of course, despite this major gap, Iran could theoretically attempt to compensate for the “blind corridors” issue using satellites. However, its engineering infrastructure—despite being heavily promoted—lacks true ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) capabilities. Tehran’s military satellites are few, in low orbit, with limited imaging capacity (often below 10 meters/pixel), and lack real-time data transmission. They are incapable of providing a continuous situational picture like Israeli or U.S. satellites can.

Sure, in theory, Tehran could turn to Moscow, Beijing, or Pyongyang for satellite support. But those familiar with real geopolitical dynamics understand that this axis cannot compete with the structural alliance between Washington and Tel Aviv. While Russia may be grateful for the Iranian drones flying over Ukraine, it does not wish to destroy its diplomatic channels with Israel. A direct and overt show of support to Tehran would make Moscow a clear target and provide Washington with the rhetorical casus belli needed to shut down any talk of appeasement—even on the Ukrainian front. Even though Trump appears less hostile toward Putin, no Russian strategist would trust him blindly, especially given the deep awareness that the U.S. military establishment strongly favors a hardline stance against both Russia and China. It is now abundantly clear that not even grim prospects—such as a third world war or a multi-front conflict—discourage American generals.

The People’s Republic of China, known for its prudence and rational approach, has opted for silent penetration in the Middle East. Its strategy is to displace the U.S. not with weapons but with the subtle grammar of soft law—investments, apparent neutrality, and the absence of overly compromising moves that could be easily exploited by enemies. Within this framework, Tehran is a tactical ally—but never a strategic one, especially in the long term.

Russian and Chinese support, therefore, is limited to the supply of basic technologies—not access to advanced satellite surveillance systems or real-time data. As mentioned earlier, if Russia or China were to provide Iran with direct access to spy satellites, it would pose an enormous geopolitical risk. Sharing military satellite data is not easy to conceal: it involves frequent communications, signal exchanges, and often visible ground-based infrastructure (control stations). The Israelis and Americans would notice. It is more likely that Russia and China have provided Iran with niche consulting and technical know-how to enhance its space and missile capabilities—perhaps even a few “civilian” satellites that can be used dually (for both civil and military purposes). North Korea, despite its frequent hostility toward Israel, has very limited space capabilities, and its support would be mostly in the realm of missile technology rather than satellite surveillance.

But there’s more: in a cognitive warfare scenario, information itself becomes part of the offensive. It is not unreasonable to assume that Israel, with its superiority in electronic warfare, may be conducting sophisticated satellite spoofing operations—simulating false movement data, altering geographic coordinates in downlink, or inserting deceptive signals into return transmissions. Even low-orbit satellite networks, if insufficiently encrypted, can be subject to MITM (Man-in-the-Middle) attacks, involving the partial or total replacement of the original telemetry package.

POTENTIAL NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES

However, not everything is unequivocally favorable to Israel and its historical allies. While Tehran has suffered a harsh and unforgettable blow, it has already begun to respond by launching missiles and drones. Numerous Israelis are dying, including children. Today’s U.S. attack on nuclear facilities also risks triggering even more serious collateral consequences: environmental contamination (across the entire Middle East), health damage that is difficult to quantify, and—most critically—a more systemic Iranian reaction that could ignite the specter of a regional or even global war.

In a scenario of uncontrolled escalation, even the loss of “only” 10,000 Jewish Israeli citizens—a realistic scenario if one imagines a prolonged conflict with Tehran and its proxies—would represent an existential shock for the State, equating to 0.13% of the Jewish Israeli population, a psychologically and strategically devastating figure. The Jewish diaspora, although crucial in providing military, financial, and diplomatic support, could not make up for such a demographic void—especially since its role has always been to support Israel from abroad, at least until the State achieves indisputable stability.

As for the hypothesis of a “regime change”—favored by some Western circles and, naturally, by the Shah’s heir—it offers no guarantee of stability. Many reformists are now in exile, and there is no assurance that a post-theocracy Iran would be any less dangerous for the West. On the contrary, the emergence of a power vacuum could pave the way for even more radical entities, or for an ungovernable form of anarchic nationalism. Today, the women of Tehran study and work despite the veil. In the future, under an even more extremist central government, they could meet the same fate as Afghan women.

If central authority were to collapse, Iran would risk fragmentation along ethnic and sectarian lines, opening the door to the full-blown Balkanization of the country. In this scenario, extremist groups like Jaish al-Adl (active in Sistan and Baluchistan) or transnational jihadist cells linked to al-Qaeda could attempt to carve out zones of influence. The former theocracy would risk transforming into an archipelago of hostile enclaves and rogue factions.

REFERENCES:

1- https://en.defence-ua.com/events/how_iran_got_awacs_from_iraq_and_why_those_jets_were_not_used_against_israel-14888.html

2- https://www.reddit.com/r/worldpowers/comments/kdn3rp/techiran_t100_transport_aircraft_and_t200_aewc/