THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF A RECKLESS ACTION
If we were to apply the concept of economic hysteresis to the geopolitical situation related to the Israeli–American attack on Iran, we would notice that a military shock does not produce only immediate and visible effects, but also reverberates in the behavior of states even when the crisis subsides. In other words, the international system does not simply return to its previous state: it undergoes a drastic and sometimes counterintuitive structural transformation.
This also applies, of course, to the MENA region, where in the future several states may reconsider their trust in Western security guarantees, strengthening their military capabilities and/or seeking new forms of regional cooperation with Sino-Russian actors. If this course of action were to prevail, the efforts made so far by Israeli and U.S. intelligence agencies would become useless, and the entire area would become a sort of mega buffer zone in which it is nearly impossible to assert dominance over the other macro-region.
To date, the reactions of various Middle Eastern leaders, as one might expect, have been rather diplomatic and cautious. There have been warnings against Iran, appropriately disseminated and emphasized so as not to disappoint domestic audiences; at the same time, Gulf and Turkish leaders have repeatedly called for de-escalation. As long as Europeans support regional partners with radar systems, naval assets, and logistical support, the situation will not change. But what will happen if the war does not “end soon,” as Trump has said? What if Dubai, Doha, Riyadh, and Salalah continue to be targeted, perhaps for months? Would Europeans, already burdened by a prolonged economic crisis and significant aid commitments to Ukraine, continue to ensure the deployment of SAMP/T systems, Eurofighter Typhoons, and Dassault Rafales?
Despite U.S. directives, it is difficult to believe that European support could increase significantly. After the first attacks on Western bases, some contingents have already begun returning home, as in the case of the Italian forces in Erbil. If the conflict were to persist, European contributions would likely remain limited and primarily defensive, focusing on radar surveillance, naval patrols, and protection of energy routes, without evolving into direct involvement in operations. After all, the European public is increasingly weary of wars and cuts to social spending.
Moreover, if Europeans were forced to participate directly in the war due to a prolonged stalemate and pressure from Trump, Israel would face a complex strategic issue. Forced interaction and the sharing of sensitive information with contingents in which significant antisemitic tendencies persist represent a concrete and difficult-to-resolve risk. In Germany and Italy, despite institutional communication aimed at minimizing the phenomenon, several cases of military personnel involved in neo-Nazi environments have emerged (1–2). Although these episodes are not extensively covered by the press, they are nevertheless recorded and catalogued by the Mossad, the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs, and AMAN. In Italy, for example, investigations have revealed military personnel expressing visceral hatred toward Jews (including Italian Jews), even advocating their exclusion from universities. Similar incidents occur across much of the continent, which is also why Israel chose to attack Iran without informing European states: trust is very limited. The real danger is that operations planned over years of painstaking work could be irreparably compromised by leaks or inappropriate conduct by hostile actors, with potentially devastating consequences for mission security, Israelis, and U.S. allies.
Returning to negative hysteresis, Iran could also respond to a prolonged conflict by orienting its strategy toward more aggressive deterrence. In fact, this line of action is already a reality, as seen in the Strait of Hormuz.
However, Iran’s strategy does not necessarily consist in formally closing this passage—a move that would also harm its own economy and that of its allies—but rather in maintaining a credible and permanent, even somewhat unpredictable threat, one that remains sufficiently vague to spread panic. Limited operations or even mere signals of risk can be enough to paralyze commercial traffic and rapidly increase insurance costs for shipping companies. Several reports note the passage of oil tankers bound for India, evidently to avoid completely disrupting energy flows to more neutral states (3).
Looking at VesselFinder, the situation appears to remain broadly unchanged. For example, on Monday, March 16, the vessel SAVONA, a 4,809-ton product tanker flying the flag of Curaçao (Netherlands) and owned by a Chinese entity through Anchorline Marine Consultants, was anchored in the United Arab Emirates, regularly transmitting its position via AIS (Automatic Identification System), with a speed of 0.1 knots and an undisclosed destination. Its prolonged stay at anchor highlights a strategy of cautious waiting, relying on the effectiveness of secret negotiations. Since the beginning of the conflict, some ships have waited 12–48 hours, others several days, while others have chosen to reroute.
In any case, the threat of pushing oil prices to $200 per barrel does not appear to be mere bluster, and the United States is beginning to fear consequences far more serious than it is willing to admit. Trump continues to plead and threaten in order to secure assistance, only to backtrack when confronted with strong European opposition. Confirming growing U.S. isolation, both Australia and Japan have declined invitations to send warships. At the same time, Trump has sought to involve China, emphasizing the need to reopen the passage ahead of the summit with Xi Jinping, originally scheduled for late March to early April 2026. However, China is less exposed to a potential Strait of Hormuz blockade: over the past two decades, Beijing has diversified its energy sources, accumulated strategic reserves sufficient for at least 3–4 months, and reduced its dependence on maritime flows through Hormuz. The deployment of Chinese naval forces therefore appears highly unlikely. Even if the SAVONA and other China-linked vessels remain stationary, it is highly probable that a partial agreement will eventually be reached. Moreover, the blockade of ships is partly mitigated through the practice of “going dark,” i.e., disabling AIS systems to avoid tracking, and by bribing local officials. Rather than a formal closure, Hormuz thus seems to be transforming into an ambiguous gray zone, a kind of unofficial toll that indirectly feeds the coffers of the IRGC.
In this context, Iran’s strategy combines selective deterrence and geopolitical pressure, based on a state of controlled instability. This approach allows Tehran to consolidate the domestic legitimacy of ideologically hardline groups and to send a clear message to potential adversaries: any military action against Iran would entail immediate and unpredictable economic and strategic consequences.
Regarding the much-discussed “regime change,” the United States appears to have become entangled in a more complex dynamic than expected. Trump has repeatedly criticized Iran’s new leadership, emphasizing its alleged inadequacy. However, even the potential alternatives supported (or at least considered) by Western circles raise non-trivial questions. The Shah’s heir, often mentioned as a reference figure for a post-regime scenario, has shown a certain vulnerability in strategic and communicative terms, even falling victim to a prank orchestrated by two well-known Russian comedians posing as German interlocutors. He did not even become suspicious when one of them introduced himself with a Hitler-like mustache and the name Adolf. While seemingly minor, this episode highlights a significant weakness: the difficulty of filtering trustworthy interlocutors and acting with the necessary caution. This raises the question of whether Washington is effectively informing, monitoring, and protecting its potential key figure. If, as it appears, this is not being done systematically, a crucial question remains: how long could a government led by Pahlavi survive in such a hostile environment?
It is also important to recall that Iran is not Venezuela. The comparison, often invoked, is misleading because the two political systems operate within radically different historical and cultural frameworks. In the Venezuelan case, even in its more radical forms, political conflict remains within a tradition that can be traced back to Western institutional models, where alternation—however conflictual—remains conceivable and not inherently opposed to human progress. The worst-case scenario for Venezuela would be to become a strictly Marxist-Leninist state, an authoritarian regime, certainly, but not foreign to Western heritage.
In Iran, by contrast, internal alternatives range across different interpretations of political Islam—more or less pragmatic or radical—but are unlikely to translate into a linear transition toward a purely liberal or Western model. There is a fundamental constraint preventing us from equating the two states: Venezuelans are largely Catholic or atheist, whereas Iranians are crypto-atheists or Muslim, with a significant proportion of fundamentalist believers. Any social or political experiment must necessarily take this difference into account.
REFERENCES:
1- https://taz.de/Bundeswehrskandal-in-Zweibruecken/!6141859/
2- https://www.lastampa.it/torino/2026/03/07/news/militari_soldati_circolo_neonazista_edoras-15535040/
3- https://www.reuters.com/world/india/iran-has-allowed-some-indian-vessels-pass-strait-hormuz-envoy-says-2026-03-14/?utm
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