GEOPOLITICAL GASLIGHTING: IN DESPERATE SEARCH OF A CASUS BELLI

FROM VON DER LEYEN’S AIRPLANE TO DRONES IN SCANDINAVIA

“It started with imagining things, she heard noises, footsteps, voices, and then the voices began to speak to her,”—this is how the manipulative husband in Gaslight, the famous 1944 film, described his deceptive strategy. Today the term refers to a communication technique that denies or distorts reality in order to confuse public opinion and make the innocent appear guilty. The same red thread runs through recent political episodes: from the airplane of the President of the European Commission to drones in Scandinavia, from aircraft intercepted near Alaska to drones shot down in Poland. A subtle warfare strategy in which the West alternates between alarms and reassurances, fiery threats and cautious denials, in a communicative game that does not aim to describe facts logically and objectively but rather to forge and direct mass perception. In other words, what really happens matters less than what the public is made to believe is happening. And this is also how citizens are led to accept, with little resistance, increased public spending on defense.

THE AIRPLANE

Take the case of Ursula von der Leyen’s airplane. On August 31, 2025, the plane carrying her from Warsaw to Plovdiv became the center of an international political and media case. According to statements from Brussels—accompanied, among other things, by threatening proclamations—the pilots reported problems with the GPS signal and were forced to request an alternative approach based on ground radar systems. The hypothesis of “deliberate interference” immediately surfaced, and several international media outlets echoed the story, evoking a Russian electronic warfare attack.

Yet data collected by Flightradar24 tells a different story. According to the flight-tracking platform, the plane departed Warsaw at 12:37 UTC, began its descent to Plovdiv at 13:45 UTC, and landed at 14:32 UTC, with minimal delay and no abnormal deviations. The technical parameters transmitted by the ADS-B transponder—particularly the Navigation Integrity Category (NIC) and the Navigation Accuracy Category for position (NACp)—showed no suspicious variation: the GPS signal remained stable throughout the flight. In the case of massive jamming, one would have expected precision drops or interruptions, but none were recorded (1).

Bulgarian authorities, cautious from the start, also emphasized that ground-based systems such as ILS and VOR had recorded no interference and that the landing took place in full safety. Prime Minister Rosen Zhelyazkov ordered further checks but acknowledged that the flight logs offered no definitive proof of hostile action (2). What at best could have seemed like a minor technical fault was thus amplified as a signal of imminent threat—only to be later scaled down by denials and clarifications that never received the same media echo as the initial accusations.

Even now, many European citizens from less educated social strata remain convinced that Russia was responsible. Nearly a month later, some TV news programs continue to link von der Leyen’s airplane case to that of the drones in Scandinavia, implying that the August 31 incident was a Moscow attack. Since the technical rebuttal is thoroughly documented, it is hard to interpret this editorial choice as mere journalistic oversight rather than as a top-down communication strategy.

In this context, Flightradar24’s role deserves attention. The platform’s data helped disprove the hypothesis of a Russian aggression. It is an independent Swedish company, with founders retaining majority shares and full operational control. In September 2025, however, a 35% stake was acquired by London-based private equity firm Sprints Capital. It will be interesting to see whether this corporate change affects the platform’s relations with Western governments and agencies in the future. Nonetheless, even while maintaining autonomy, Flightradar24 has in the past accepted to limit the visibility of certain sensitive data (such as U.S. military flights), thereby showing a degree of malleability in cooperating with authorities.

This opens an interesting scenario. If the Swedes have cooperated in the past on certain issues, it is plausible that in this case too the United States exerted formal or informal pressure on the company’s leadership to publicly clarify the actual dynamics of the flight. But why would Washington choose this line? One possible interpretation is that Trump—at least—wished to distance himself from von der Leyen’s interventionist ambitions (she is personally and professionally close to Scotland Yard and NATO) and to lower the tone in managing international conflicts, even at the cost of irritating more aggressive intelligence apparatuses. Of course, this remains speculative, and however logical, nothing is certain. All the more since Trump’s political strategy has often been marked by seemingly contradictory moves—advancing and retreating like the step of a crab.

POLAND

If the von der Leyen airplane episode highlighted the ambiguities of perception—between media alarms and technical rebuttals—the Polish incursion only reinforced that impression, once again foregrounding uncertainty and reality manipulation. On the night of September 9–10, 2025, dozens of drones violated Polish airspace. Warsaw immediately spoke of a “deliberate provocation” and shot down several aircraft, with the government calling for NATO consultations and promising rapid modernization of the armed forces. But here too, the outlines remain murky: it is unclear whether this was a planned attack, a probing mission, or a political maneuver staged to provoke a reaction. In Italy, several analysts and academics, such as Vittorio Emanuele Parsi, hypothesized a Russian intent to test European defenses. Yet it must be noted that such figures are almost always organically tied to the Atlanticist sphere, sometimes linked to NATO’s Selected Reserve or embedded in circles close to Western apparatuses. Parsi, for instance—something TV studios omit to mention—is not only a university professor but also an officer in the Navy’s Selected Reserve, holding the rank of frigate captain (4)(5). It is difficult to believe that individuals within the Atlanticist organizational structure can speak with full independence and freedom of judgment.

Among the reconstructions circulated in subsequent days, one particularly troubling hypothesis emerged, consistent with the logic of “forging perceptions”: that the drones were not directly launched by Russia but were Russian aircraft that had crashed in Ukraine, recovered almost intact, repaired by Ukrainians, and then flown toward the Polish border (6)(7). In addition, some reports suggest that one of the objects shot down at Wyryki-Wola was not a Russian drone but a defective Polish missile fired during air defense operations (8). A grotesque detail that also raises concern about Europe’s actual defensive capabilities.

According to proponents of this reading, such a false flag would have a dual effect: on the one hand, it would provide sufficiently convincing material evidence to support the claim of external aggression (images of a destroyed roof help generate pathos among impressionable populations); on the other, it would push allied governments to back increased defense spending—otherwise hard to justify amid today’s West, marked by social friction, unemployment, and industrial stagnation.

This hypothesis should be treated with caution: it is technically and tactically plausible but requires direct proof to be more than a strategic suggestion. Yet its mere circulation is itself revealing: it shows how, in a scenario of growing polarization, even ordnance and wreckage become narrative tools able to steer political decisions, mobilize resources, and consolidate threat frames. This is precisely the ground where geopolitical gaslighting plays out.

Notably, in the days immediately following the Polish drone incursion, some European governments (especially Poland) began publicly discussing the possibility of instituting a no-fly zone along NATO’s eastern borders. Warsaw raised the issue at NATO, stressing the need to prevent future violations and protect member states’ airspace, while Berlin and others called for further study on the operational and legal feasibility of such a measure. The idea was accompanied by official statements about “ensuring security and deterrence” and enthusiastic political declarations evoking reinforced protection scenarios. In practice, however, imposing a no-fly zone is far from simple. It requires permanent interception capabilities, advanced radar surveillance, and above all, willingness to neutralize any hostile air defense. The Libyan experience of 2011 shows that even with an international mandate, a no-fly zone quickly turns into offensive military operations, with all the inevitable risks of escalation. The risk here would be nothing less than the start of World War III.

DRONES OVER NORTHERN EUROPE

In September 2025, the skies of Scandinavia (and to a lesser extent, Germany, Finland, and Lithuania) became the scene of numerous unidentified drone sightings. Objects were observed near strategic civilian and military infrastructure, including Aalborg base in Denmark, the airports of Esbjerg and Sønderborg, and Flyvestation Skrydstrup—the main base for Danish F-16s and F-35s. On September 22, Copenhagen airport was forced to suspend flights for several hours, with significant economic consequences. Local authorities initially spoke of threats of Russian origin, and international media amplified the theme of a “new hybrid war,” generating public alarm and calls for strengthened military cooperation.

However, hard evidence remains scarce, and several official reports are still classified. To date, we have only a handful of photos or brief videos that do not clarify the nature of the sightings. Even identifying drone types is difficult. Descriptions vary: some witnesses speak of simple commercial drones (and two tourists from Singapore were arrested during those days), others of sophisticated military aircraft. Scandinavian authorities, on more than one occasion, regarding possible Russian involvement, had to admit the lack of concrete evidence. The dynamic closely recalls past events, with a rapid transition from mere technical observation to amplified political-media narrative, turning suspicions and hints into crystalline certainties.

While the Russian hypothesis remains possible, it is no less plausible that the Scandinavian sightings represent the transatlantic application of tactics already tested a year earlier in New Jersey: a geographic transposition of the same operational model, adapted to the North European coasts. Both areas have numerous critical installations distributed along relatively low, accessible shorelines. Both allow testing of drones over short to medium distances, with sea-to-land transitions and variable weather conditions. The only difference lies in the lack of clear imagery. It is possible that after testing this operation at home, U.S. planners realized the danger of spreading detailed images and videos, and in Scandinavia adopted a more cautious strategy, allowing very few visual testimonies to leak—utterly unusable by Sino-Russian intelligence. Thus, anyone is free to imagine Gerbera drones were found, but the truth is, we do not know.

What operational risks cast doubt on a large-scale Russian operation? It seems obvious that sending drones from Russia to Germany or Scandinavia is impossible, as they would be intercepted immediately. The journey is too long. Thus, in recent days, many outlets speculated about the involvement of the Alexander Shabalin vessel, which had its transponders switched off (9), or the Astrol-1, Oslo Carrier-3, and the tanker Pushpa (10).

Indeed, drones can be easily launched from merchant ships or modified fishing boats. They require no catapults or vast spaces—just a free deck. However, they have limited range (tens of kilometers), so vessels would need to be very close to European coasts—a risky move, as they would be quickly detected by radar or maritime surveillance systems. Long-range military drones, like the Orlan-10 or Shahed-136, require dedicated containers or catapults to be launched from ships or submarines. Russia does have “container launchers,” but using them in the North Sea or Baltic would be strategic suicide, as NATO warships constantly patrol those waters.

Launching drones from submarines is safer but technically more difficult. It requires watertight capsules compatible with torpedo tubes, reliable opening mechanisms, folding-wing drones, and satellite or radio relay links that increase detectability. As far as we know, Moscow has not yet reached this technology, though it is working on it.

One crucial detail cannot be overlooked. If many drones were flying simultaneously across multiple states, several naval platforms would be required in different areas at the same time. This is logistically complex: it would mean an extended naval presence easily detectable. Within days, Europeans would catch on, and every Russian ship, fishing boat, or submarine would be spied upon, monitored, and closely shadowed. It is worth recalling that the drone/UAP phenomenon in Northern Europe has lasted nearly a month (11). It is hard to believe European states did not coordinate and exchange classified information. If the threat were real and attributable with a good degree of certainty to Russia, we would not still be seeing spectacular new cases in Denmark.

The hypothesis of Russian agents infiltrated on the ground remains, but it would be an extremely risky choice for the Kremlin: in minutes, it could compromise years of intelligence gathering and human assets. Russian spies usually lead perfectly normal lives and aim to collect information through conventional means, minimizing exposure risk. Such a blatant operation would be unprecedented. The drone wreckage found at Luitemaa, in Estonia’s coastal nature reserve (12), seems almost tailored to reinforce the image of a ship-based launch, rather than a dormant-cell operation.

Thus, here too, we find much “gaslighting”: factual elements, exaggerations, and falsehoods move in parallel, so tightly interwoven as to outline an ever more confused and Machiavellian picture. Meanwhile, unsettling suppositions also circulate within the Eastern bloc, albeit on a smaller scale. On social media, for example, some speculated that these operations were the prelude to a Western attack on Kaliningrad (13). Of course, this is an unverified claim from unofficial channels, and must be read cautiously, without assigning it undue importance. Yet it illustrates how a conflict in Northern Europe is perceived as a concrete possibility.

Faced with this growing concern, European states are beginning to move accordingly. Germany, for instance, has announced the creation of a new Center for Defense against Drones, meant to coordinate expertise between central and regional governments (14). At the same time, the Air Security Law is under review to allow armed forces to intervene, including the possibility of shooting down drones to protect critical infrastructure.

At the European level, the EU and NATO are accelerating the implementation of an “anti-drone wall” along the eastern flank, through the Eastern Flank Watch project, which envisions a network of advanced sensors for detection, tracking, and interception of drones (15). EU Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius stressed the urgency of this initiative, while NATO announced the imminent deployment of new anti-drone systems. This combination of measures shows how the perception of threat—even when fueled by speculation and conflicting narratives—is already producing concrete effects on Europe’s defense policies. Without the past month’s events, we probably would not have reached this point.

REFERENCES:

1- https://www.flightradar24.com/blog/aviation-explainer-series/ursula-von-der-leyen-gps-jamming/

2- https://www.ilpost.it/2025/09/04/bulgaria-aereo-von-der-leyen-senza-prove/

3- From an early age, Ursula von der Leyen was immersed in the transatlantic world: the daughter of a European institutions executive and with an American grandmother, she spent her years of study at the London School of Economics under Scotland Yard’s protection, adopting the fictitious identity of “Rose Ladson” due to threats linked to the RAF. Her career, from Germany’s Minister of Defense to President of the European Commission, later led her to develop institutional ties with NATO and transatlantic think tanks, consolidating a clearly Atlanticist profile.

4- https://www.la7.it/omnibus/video/droni-russi-in-polonia-il-prof-parsi-ci-sono-motivazioni-per-averlo-fatto-deliberatamente-12-09-2025-610093

5- https://cattolicanews.it/parsi-capitano-su-nave-bergamini

6- https://disa.org/russian-disinformation-campaign-promotes-false-narrative-regarding-drone-incursion-into-poland/

7- https://it.insideover.com/guerra/droni-abbattuti-in-polonia-lipotesi-dellesperto-bryen-coinvolge-kiev.html

8- https://meduza.io/en/news/2025/09/17/malfunctioning-missile-fired-from-f-16-fell-on-polish-house-during-russian-drone-incursion-polish-media-report

9- https://www.open.online/2025/09/26/danimarca-nave-russa-droni-avvistati-aeroporti-transponder-spento/

10- https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20250926-denmark-drone-incursions-all-signs-point-to-russia-suspect-ships

11- https://www.euronews.com/2025/09/10/russian-spy-drones-over-germany-turn-into-an-even-greater-threat

12- https://militarnyi.com/en/news/fragment-of-unidentified-drone-discovered-on-the-coast-of-the-gulf-of-riga-in-estonia/

13- https://x.com/Islamic593554/status/1972275486551314529

14- https://news.liga.net/en/politics/news/germany-wants-to-create-a-center-for-defense-against-drones

15- https://www.ansa.it/sito/notizie/mondo/europa/2025/09/26/ue-nato-formano-il-drone-wall-zelensky-vuole-i-tomahawk_0f034238-1d52-4b88-b1a9-73256990d91a.html