WHAT DOES PRIGOŽIN RISK?
BETWEEN KADYROVTSY, PATRIOT, REDUT, AND POTOK, HIS POWER HAS BEEN WITHERING FOR MONTHS, PERHAPS YEARS
What remains of this day after the orgy of subvassals - politicians, journalists, and fake analysts - eagerly waiting to see Putin hanging upside down in Red Square? Has the power of the "tsar" truly ended as rumored in the West, or is the picture more complex than we are willing to admit? Yesterday, as soon as the leader of Wagner decided to march against Moscow, getting bogged down in Voronezh (520 km from the capital, although he claims to have reached 200 km), with only Rostov under his direct control (1075 km from Moscow), many spoke of a weakened Russia, nearing its end, destined to be dismembered and possibly occupied. But the truth is that Prigožin's endeavor, rather than crossing the Rubicon (an episode evoked by Italian journalists), seemed to be a failed conspiracy of Catiline. Historians have always speculated that behind Catiline was Caesar, and now many believe that behind the former convict with a murky past lies the CIA. But even if that were true, would this American strategy really serve any purpose, or is it yet another waste of money?
Anyone familiar with NATO's military strategy courses knows how much emphasis is placed, with a certain degree of obstinacy and obtuseness, on the Wagner Group. Some professors describe them as the incarnation of evil, a specter of "Asian" barbarism, and wrongly compare them to the ancient Volksdeutschen, who, being composed of women and children as well, were certainly not assimilable to the Russians. NATO courses also never refer to the Blackwater/Academi group or other Western mercenaries/contractors. But even the press does not deviate from this directive, and it is incredible how it defines Russian mercenaries as "mercenaries" and NATO's counterparts as "contractors" or "volunteers." Yet, a fundamental law of modern armies is precisely that of "parallelism." No modern state would ever dream of placing absolute trust in only the regular army or a single group of mercenaries. It would be risky in the event of a coup and counterproductive in case of disorganization. Having mercenaries/contractors helps maneuver in the shadows, avoiding the state being accused of anything, at least formally, and prevents general mobilization in times of war. Having two or more groups of mercenaries is a logical consequence because it allows for the implementation of one's strategic goals in different territories, making it more difficult to trace the origin (who funds them). Furthermore, when the groups are numerous, they can't accumulate unlimited power. The information they access will always be fragmented, limited to a single theater of war or a single critical sector. They may collaborate with other groups, but only to the extent permitted, and due to inter-service rivalry, they will never have a comprehensive view. A comprehensive view is essential to carry out a coup, even if you are Prigožin, even if you command 25,000 men.
The Wagner Group, as powerful as it may be, does not pose a threat that jeopardizes the unity of the Russian Federation. Former criminals and Serbian ex-military personnel may be useful, yes, but they can never face a numerically vast army like the Russian one. As ruthless as they may be, they can never be equipped and trained like the regular army or one of the many mercenary groups directly sponsored by the state. For example, the Patriot Group (ЧВК «Патриот»), most likely maneuvered by Shoigu, is better equipped, better trained, and better paid. The Wagner mercenaries recently saw their salary decrease from 240,000 rubles to 160,000 rubles per month, while a Patriot mercenary's salary can exceed one million rubles per month (1). It is difficult to know exactly how many men are in this latter group; it is assumed to be many, but it is important to note that the number of mercenaries in a group is only indicative to a certain extent and depends mainly on the trust of the institutions, which can also vary over time. The Wagner Group started during the Crimea invasion with only a few thousand men and reached a peak of 40,000-50,000 men, but now they count half that number, also due to casualties. It is not unlikely that, after Prigožin's recklessness, this number will further decrease.
Another significant group is Redut, a direct emanation of the GRU, led by a relative of Vladimir Alexseyev, the deputy head of Russian intelligence, who made himself heard yesterday by launching an attack against the leader of Wagner. Their exact number is unknown, not many according to rumors, but like all other groups closely associated with the Ministry of Defense, they proudly showcase their official pages, emphasizing how their salary is higher than that of Wagner and the numerous state benefits they enjoy (2). These differences in treatment, bordering on mobbing, a constant for groups close to the state, have enticed several Wagner fighters to join the ranks of the Reduts.
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